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This article discusses training decisions using an approach that considers the wage gap and 
the probability of employability gap pre- and post training, taking the gains from these two 
elements as the key to the decision to undertake training. The application of this approach 
to the Uruguayan case, given the surprisingly low participation in public training programs 
suggests as a likely hypothesis that public training provision is not attractive enough for 
unskilled  workers  because  of  the  limited  benefits  reported  to  potential  trainees,  even 
discounting for cash incentives to participate. Other explanations are not ruled out. A long-
term policy recommendation is to strengthen basic education, as education and training 
seem complementary rather than substitutes.  




El  presente  artículo  discute  las  decisiones  de  capacitación  basadas  en  un  enfoque  que 
considera la brecha salarial y la probabilidad de empleabilidad pre y post entrenamiento, 
tomando las ganancias en estos elementos como las claves en la decisión. La aplicación de 
este  enfoque  para  el  caso  de  Uruguay,  sugiere,  en  función  de  la  observada  escasa 
participación  en  los  programas  de  entrenamiento,  como  hipótesis  probable  que  los 
programas públicos de capacitación no son suficientemente atractivos para los trabajadores 
no calificados debido a los limitados beneficios que reportan a los potenciales demandantes 
de  capacitación,  aun  descontando  eventuales  subsidies  directos  para  participar  de  los 
programas. Sin embargo, otras explicaciones no son descartadas. Como recomendación de 
largo  plazo  surge  el  promover  el  fortalecimiento  de  la  educación  básica  ya  que  la 
educación formal y el entrenamiento parecen comportarse más como complementarios que 
como sustitutos.  
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External shocks, changing patterns in demands, or innovation cause alterations in sectoral 
activities,  which  necessarily  induce  resource  reallocation.  However,  factors  may  prove 
difficult  to  move  speedily,  or  may  be  inadequate  for  alternative  uses.  An  important 
limitation is when those factors are in fixed supply in the economy and new sectors are 
expanding. Education and training may ease the intersectoral mobility of workers, allowing 
the reallocation of workers to jobs in booming sectors or in sectors. Ideally, education 
policies should be designed with a forward-looking perspective, considering the challenge 
that  the  future  would  bring,  in  particular,  considering  the  economic  trends  in  trade, 
technology,  and  innovation.  However,  it  seems  that  the  past  is  very  much  relevant  in 
designing remedial training programs for dislocated workers during unemployment crisis, 
paying attention to riskier jobs during an economic downturn, to be able to have adequate 
contingency plans in place as stand by.  
Training  programs  can  be  very  differently  designed,  whether  they  are  to  be  used  as 
contingency plans either as a continuous support to upgrade skills according to changes in 
technology or as requirements of expanding sectors. However, what could seem a good 
training program as a contingency plan may not be the better option for continuous training 
programs. If there is a role for the public sector in training, it is to ease workers’ mobility 
in a crisis or to accompany changing patterns in demand and technical progress, as public 
intervention would reduce productivity loss and/or unemployment. Much is written on the 
role  of  the  government  as  provider  of  education  and  training  (e.g.  Poterba,  1994, 
Beauchemin, 2001, Trostel, 2002; De Fraja, 2005, OECD et al. 2010, among others) and 
on evaluation of the performance of public training programs (e.g. Sims, 1993; LaLonde, 
1995, Courty and Marschke, 1997, 2003, 2007; Greenberg et al. 2003, 2004; Dmitrijeva 
and Hazans, 2007, among many). These issues will not be discussed in this article, as the 
focus  will  be  instead  on  workers’  decision  to  undertake  training,  in  particular  public 
training. Education and training is essentially a decision to invest in human capital (as 
noted by the pioneering work by Becker, 1962, and Ben-Porath, 1967, among others), but 
there  is  also  a  vast  literature  exploring  the  fundamentals  for  not  engaging  in  further 
qualifications (e.g.,Comay et al., 1976; Manski,1989; Koshal et al., 1995; Eckstein and 
Wolpin,1999; Thomas et al. 2002; and Oureopoulos,2003). 2 
 
Educational institutions, firms, and training centers, private or public, have a dominant role 
in  generating  skills.  As  in  any  investment  decisions,  individuals  would  compare  the 
potential benefits of acquiring further qualifications against the required costs to obtain it. 
Training programs could offer the chance to receive a qualification, in a labour market 
where the demand for skills is on the rise, and in a market that penalises the less skilled 
with low wages, higher unemployment rates, and harsher working conditions.  
However, workers’ decisions are not always easy to understand. For instance, in Uruguay 
the  rising  demand  for  skills  is  well  documented,  as  well  as  the  scarcity  of  qualified 
workers.(e.g.,  PNUD,  2005;  Vaillant  et  al.  2009).  However,  in  Uruguay,  workers’ 
participation  in  public  training  programs  is  scarce.  There  are  at  least  three  possible 
hypotheses to explain it: 1) public provision is rationed; 2) the benefits of available training 
programs are low; 3) unskilled workers are too anxious, therefore, strong/er incentives 
would be needed.  
The reality in Uruguay seems to show that there is no shortage of options and providers of 
training  programs,  with  a  variety  of  aims,  formats,  and  target  groups.  The  official 
institution,  El  Instituto  Nacional  de  Empleo  y  Formación  Profesional  (INEFOP)  is  in 
charge  of  public  training;  and  the  offer  is  varied.  In  addition,  other  institutions  offer 
training: Consejo de Capacitación Profesional (COCAP) works in close collaboration with 
the  private  sector  and  MIDES  (Ministry  of  Social  Development)  offers  programs 
particularly  for  the  vulnerable  population.  Thus,  this  article  aims  to  provide  a  basic 
approach to assist us in assessing the rationality of workers’ decisions to engage in public 
training. 
The  rest  of  the  article  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  II,  the  fundamentals  of  the 
theoretical framework are explained; Section III presents an application to the Uruguayan 
case; and the Section IV concludes. 
II Training or not? Key elements 
Education and training determine the qualifications of the labor force, and the nature of 
those qualifications may affect labor mobility. Workers with different skills have different 
productivity  and  wages,  as  well  as  differing  in  their  intersectoral  mobility  and 
opportunities of finding a job.  3 
 
The complete specification of workers’ decision would require the specification of the 
parameters corresponding to the probability of unemployment, the cost of training, and the 
expected  wage  gain  with  training.  In  a  two-period  model,  assuming  constant  wages, 
lifetime income for an individual with and without training is 
 NT NT NT p w p w I 2 2      
where  2 w is the wage rate of an unskilled worker,  NT p  is the probability of  remaining 
employed,    is the subjective discount factor,    d   1 1  , d is the discount rate. For 
those workers who undergo training, lifetime earnings are 
  T T p w w I 1 2         
where   is the proportion of an unskilled wage rate that the individual pays for or receives 
as stimulus to receive training, including opportunity costs ( 0   , 0   ). 
The wage gap can be expressed as  2 1 1 w w g  ,  1 1  g  , the employability gap between 
trained and not trained can be expressed as NT T p p g  2 ,  1 0 2  g . In general terms, a 














Given the above expression, and considering the parameters involved, a worker is mor e 
likely to choose training when 
-  The greater is the wage gap ( 1 g ), as this makes training more attractive. 
-  The greater is the gain in probability of employability if trained ( 2 g ).  
-  The greater is the payment to workers during training, and the higher is the probability 
of being unemployed of those untrained.  
Personal traits also play a role, as lower the discount is (high ), so the less impatient 
individuals are more likely to undertake training.  4 
 
III Examining the Uruguayan case 
Available data on training in 2006 from the National Census Bureau in Uruguay allows 
presenting a fairly complete description of the provision of training. The Panel A of Table 
1  shows  that  the  majority  of  participants  in  training  programs  finance  the  courses 
themselves, and that there is an important participation of firms in the provision of training, 
higher than that for the public sector. It is noteworthy that the unskilled workers group 
undertaking training is by far the smallest one.  
 
Table 1 Structure of training programs by skill group and source of funding (%) - 
Uruguay 2006 
PANEL A 
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Publicly funded  3  10  3  17 
Financed by firms  3  16  6  25 
Paid by the worker  1  37  12  49 
Training scholarship  6  2  1  9 
Total  12  66  21  100 
PANEL B         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Publicly funded  19  61  20  100 
Financed by firms  11  66  23  100 
Paid by the worker  1  76  23  100 
Training scholarship  64  28  8  100 
Total  12  66  21  100 
PANEL C         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Publicly funded  26  16  16  17 
Financed by firms  23  25  27  25 
Paid by the worker  5  56  54  49 
Training scholarship  46  4  3  9 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Source: Own elaboration with data from National Census Bureau (INE, 2006). Workers groups: Unskilled 
(less than 9 years of schooling), Medium skilled (9 –15), Skilled (16 or more). 
The Panel B of Table 1 shows the provision of public training is allocated to about 60% of 
the medium skilled, and around 20% each to the skilled and unskilled. The structure of 
provision of the private sector is quite similar (though with a stronger participation of the 
skilled).  Regarding  Panel  C,  as  might  have  been  suspected,  the  unskilled  rely  almost 5 
 
absolutely on the provision of training by firms or the public sector, contrary to the higher 
qualified groups that in their absolute majority finance training themselves. 
 
The  structure  of  participants  in  training  courses  by  employment  status  (employed  or 
unemployed) is similar to that in the entire labor force, though interesting details arise. The 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the vast majority of trainees are medium skilled employed 
workers (58%). Panel B shows that there is not much difference among the less skilled 
(unskilled and medium skilled) in undertaking training, being employed or not. The final 
Panel C in Table 2 shows that although training for the employed favor the more skilled 
(skilled  and  medium  skilled),  training  programs  for  the  unemployed  prioritises  the 
provision to the less skilled (unskilled and medium skilled); in any case the dominant 
group is the medium skilled.  
 
Table 2 Participants in training by employment situation (%) – Uruguay 2006 
PANEL A 
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Employed  10  58  20  89 
Unemployed  2  8  1  11 
Total  12  66  21  100 
PANEL B         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Employed  85  88  93  89 
Unemployed  15  12  7  11 
Total  100  100  100  100 
PANEL C         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Employed  12  66  22  100 
Unemployed  17  71  13  100 
Total  12  66  21  100 
Source: Own elaboration based with data from INE (2006). 
 
The information in Table 3 is restricted to public training programs, where it is worthwhile 
noting in Panel C that the allocation of training resources has a strong emphasis on the 
unskilled between the unemployed, however, that is not the case for the employed. 
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Table 3 Structure of participants in public training programs – Uruguay 2006 
PANEL A         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Employed  15  53  18  86 
Unemployed  4  8  1  14 
Total  19  61  20  100 
PANEL B         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Employed  77  87  94  86 
Unemployed  23  13  6  14 
Total  100  100  100  100 
PANEL C         
  Unskilled  Medium 
skilled  Skilled  Total 
Employed  17  61  21  100 
Unemployed  32  60  8  100 
Total  19  61  20  100 
Source: Own elaboration based with data from INE (2006). 
A final dimension is given by the percentage of those receiving training by qualification 
and  employment  status,  as  shown  in  Table  4.  Firstly,  in  all  categories,  the  share  of 
participants  in  training  in  the  entire  workforce  is  very  small.  Secondly,  this  share  is 
increasing  with  the  level  of  qualification.  Thirdly,  the  higher  participation  is  for  the 
unemployed for all qualification levels, but the difference is not that relevant. 
 
Table 4 Participants in training by employment status (% over relevant group)- 
Uruguay, 2006 
Total training programs  Public training programs 
  Employed  Unemployed    Employed  Unemployed 
Unskilled  1.3  1.5  Unskilled  0.3  0.6 
Medium 
skilled  5.2  5.5  Medium 
skilled  0.8  0.9 
Skilled  7.1  8.3  Skilled  1.1  1.1 
Total  4.0  3.9  Total  0.7  0.8 
Source: Own elaboration with data from INE (2006). 
 
The  picture  Table  4  presents  seems  odd  and  difficult  to  explain.  For  instance,  the 
participation in training is low even for public programs; unemployed people do not reveal 
a strong demand for training, nor do the unskilled workers. . Why are people not engaging 
much in training? Is not a rentable enough activity? Is there a shortage of funds to offer 
public training programs? Is the available supply of training courses inadequate? Should 7 
 
incentives be stronger? The analytical approach may assist us to shed some light on these 
points. 
 
The approach presented in Section II is applied to the Uruguayan case. The computations 
below assume a base training program of one year and prospective trainees’working life of 
30, 10, or 5 years, respectively, to accommodate for different types of prospective jobs (in 
particular,  temporary  jobs  nonrenewable)  as  well  as  taking  into  consideration  the 
characteristics  of  workers  to  receive  training  (in  particular  age).  The  actual  length  of 
training programs is highly variable; therefore, the one year training program assumed in 
the  baseline  is  arbitrary.  In  the  baseline,  unskilled  workers  would  choose  whether  to 
undergo training; untrained workers will continue to receive unskilled wage rate, trained 
workers are assumed to start receiving medium skilled wage rate (this assumption will be 
relaxed). Wages are computed to each skill category with data for the year 2009. 
 
Table 5 shows the expected benefits of training. Panel A of the table shows that in any case 
for standard discount rates around 3% training is always beneficial, with subsidy equal to 
zero, even for short-term jobs, but this is not always the case for higher discount rates or 
shorter term jobs. Panel B of Table 4 shows the expected benefits of training in the case the 
subsidy  is  higher  than  zero  ( =0.10),  which  makes  the  benefits  from  training  always 
positive. 
Table 5 Expected gains from training 
PANEL A: No 
subsidy  IT-INT 






0  0.03  0.21  0.06  0.01 
0  0.10  0.07  0.03  -0.01 
0  0.50  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
0  0.90  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04 
PANEL B: with 
subsidy   






0.1  0.03  0.28  0.13  0.07 
0.1  0.10  0.14  0.09  0.06 
0.1  0.50  0.04  0.04  0.03 
0.1  0.90  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Source: Own elaboration. 8 
 
In the model, a couple of assumptions remain to be relaxed. The prospective trainee will 
count in his or her computation the skill premium to receive for a better qualification ( 1 g ) 
as  well  as  an  improvement  in  his or her  employability  probability  ( 2 g ).  In  the  above 
computations, these gaps,  1 g  and  2 g , have been assumed to be the difference between an 
unskilled  and  a  medium  skilled  worker;  however,  receiving  a  short  training  may  not 
produce such dramatic benefits. Therefore, alternative scenarios are designed, assuming 
other options for both key wedges in the training decision. The target is to explore the 
slackness in computations in Table 5, that is, trying to determine if the gains of training are 
not equal to those corresponding to a medium skilled level, which levels would be the 
thresholds to maintain the training option still attractive. 
 
Table 6 Training as an option: margins at work  
  A  A1  A2 
1 g   1.51  1.20  1.51 
2 g   0.82  0.82  0.67 
IT-INT  0.13  0  0 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Alternatives are presented in Table 6. The benchmark scenario is A where  d =0.03, and 
 =0.10. The length of training programs is one year, expected working lifespan 10 years, 
skill  premium  1.51  ( 2 1 1 w w g    computed  for  2009),  the  employability  gap  is  0.67 
( NT T p p g  2  computed for 2009). Scenario A1 computes the maximum reduction in the 
wage gap that would still induce individuals to engage  in training, whereas scenario A2 
computes the maximum reduction in the probability of employability to still be interested 
in undergoing training. Table 5 shows that even a skill premium of 20% instead 51% (other 
factors  equal)  will  still  make  training  attractive;  similarly  a   gain  in  probability  of 
employability of 67% instead 82% (other factors equal) would still make training courses 
attractive. At least in the case of Uruguay only a small subset of  the available programs 
could generate such benefits, for instance, only occasionally a course would allow the 





This  article  discusses  training  decisions  for  unskilled  workers  based  on  a  scheme  that 
considers the wage gap and the probability of employability gap pre- and post training, 
taking the gains from these two elements as the key to the decision. This approach is 
applied to the Uruguayan case, and given the observed low participation in public training 
programs, the possible hypothesis could be: 1) public provision is rationed; 2) the benefits 
of available training programs are low, 3) unskilled workers are too anxious, therefore, 
strong/er incentives would be needed.  
The results suggests as likely the hypothesis that public training provision is not attractive 
enough to unskilled workers because of the limited benefits reported to potential trainees, 
even discounting for cash incentives to participate, which may help to explain the scarce 
interest in participation in public programs, although other explanations are not ruled out. 
In particular, considering Becker and Mulligan’s (1997) discussion on time preferences, 
impatience cannot be ruled out as an important disincentive factor for engaging in training.  
A long-term policy recommendation that seems to arise is to strengthen basic education as 
education and training seem complementary rather than substitutes, in the line with what 
has been suggested by Heckman and Masterov (2004), and Labarca (1998), among others. 
Other relevant aspects of training and/or contingency plans referring to genre, regional 
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